Tag: Value Investing

Value vs Growth

If you follow the financial media and the media coverage around stock markets on topic that repeatedly pops up is the Value vs Growth debate. Apparently, Value has underperformed Growth for many years now and some have even gone so far as to declare Value Investing dead.

Why Value Investing is indeed Dead

I also think that Value Investing is dead, but not for same reasons that the pundits do. The general conception of the value is dead logic is that:

  1. The market is much more efficient now and the competition within value investors is fiercest. This drives away any pricing opportunities sooner that it used to be.
  2. The internet and globalization has created an environment with more extreme scaling effects and power laws. This results in winner-takes-it-all situations where one or two players dominate the market and take in all the profits.

The conventional value invest retort is that value is relative to price. That is, that a good company is not a good investment at any price. Value investors also tend to believe that the move into passive investing has favored companies that are considered growth companies at the cost of companies that would be considered value stocks.

What is the opposite of Growth Investing?

My logic for declaring Value Investing dead, is that Value Investing never existed in the first place. Value Investing and Growth Investing are both fundamental investing methodologies. Both strategies are looking at fundamental factors (revenues, earnings, cash flows) and estimating the current value from those factors.

But is value the opposite of growth? If Growth Investing is about discovering and investing in companies that are growing fast and that this growth underestimated in the current value of the stock. You could say that growth investors are of the opinion that the market over-discounts the value of future profitability of high quality growth companies.

The opposite of Growth Investing would be to discovering and investing in companies that are deteriorating but that this deterioration is overestimated in the current value of the stock (and/or higher up in the capital structure). The opposite of Growth Investing, in my humble opinion, is Distressed Investing.

Distressed investing is Value Investing. But Growth Investing is also Value Investing, because all Value Investing is just Fundamental Investing.

Value and Growth are Joined at the Hip

Most people think Warren Buffett is a value investor but if you want to go into the particulars, one could argue that he is primarily a fundamental investor. Buffett famously said that growth and value are joined at the hip. Both are areas of fundamental analysis.

One could also argue that many business owners would not easily understand the question if you would ask if they focus more on growth or value in their capital allocations. Business owners simply allocate capital to the projects with the highest expected IRR, irrespective of any category you might want to fit it into. 

Personally, I really like the framework put forth by the late Marty Whitman. In his opinion, there are are 5 main areas of fundamental finance: 

  1. Value Investing (limited to minority positions in public co’s) 
  2. Distress Investing
  3. Control Investing
  4. Credit Analysis
  5. First and Second Stage Venture Capital Investments

Warren Buffett, as an example, has been active in all of those categories, either directly or indirectly. Henry Singleton, as well, is someone you could not classify as a value investor specifically. He just went where he thought the highest IRR was at any given time.

Why is Chuck Royce such a Good Investor?

The title of this post is a question posed by Tobias Carlisle to his guest Micheal Green of the Logica Fund, on his The Acquirers Podcast. Micheal’s answer to this question was pretty interesting, to say the least, and beautifully formulates the investment framework of Chuck Royce and the Royce Funds.

Michael Green: “First of all, Chuck has just an incredible mind and an incredible awareness of the embedded optionality in securities. And so, his philosophy as it relates to securities selection at Royce [Funds] was that he focused on small cap stocks, but he required that they have very low levels of leverage. And the reason why he did that…I think he intuitively knew this but I don’t think certainly he was explicitly modelling it in the same way I would be forced to do.

When he recognized this, that they had option-like characteristics, right, owning a portfolio that has small cap names in it is the greatest potential to exhibit that lottery-like winner capability. And he was very agnostic between value and growth from that standpoint. Always looking for that option-like characteristic. But his simple rule was that the company couldn’t have enough leverage that would lead to aggregation or a shortening of that option duration.

So he was effectively trying to pick infinitely lived option-like assets. And he just did it extraordinary well. I mean, he had seen so many management teams and he had seen so much. I met him in 2003 for the first time and he had been running Penn Mutual Fund which was the core of the Royce universe. Which he acquired for $1 in 1974. People forget how bad things got.

There is maybe a little bit of this feeling in the active manager community today. But he was able to buy Penn Mutual Fund for $1 dollar. Because the owner, it had assets, and it had a bit of a track record. But the owner was incapable of paying directors salaries, registration fees etc. So he bought it for a dollar and then it proceeded to lose money for some time as he paid directors and others. But it turned into this extraordinary vehicle on the back of his talent. 

Tobias Carlisle: My interpretation of the Royce firm is that they seem to have a holding in every single stock I ever look at. A tiny holding. 

Michael Green: So, I think that’s true. I think that is again a reflection of Chuck’s philosophy that each of his securities represents this option like characteristics. A typical portfolio of Royce would have somewhere in the neighborhood of 160 to 300 stocks. There would be multiple portfolios.

Portfolios would typically be launched in a new fund when we thought it was a peak of a market. Which sounds counter-intuitive. Until you realize that what this actually means is that you have launched a vehicle that has an excess of cash in an environment of high valuations. And so as the markets sell off, that cash creates actually an out-performance characteristic.

So when the next cycle emerges, not only did you have cash to deploy at more attractive valuations, but you benefited from the cash component. And I mean, that type of insight. And again, I highly doubt that Chuck modeled it, but he just knew it intuitively. And that’s part of what I referred to with my respect to Chuck. I think he is probably the single finest investor I have encountered.

How to Invest like Warren Buffett?

If you are asking yourself this question, you are asking yourself the wrong question. At the very least, I would propose you implement a minor tweak to it: How would Warren Buffett be investing if he were in your shoes? 

The thing is that the investing style of Warren Buffett has changed immensely over time. That’s just because he is extremely smart and extremely adaptable. And you wouldn’t want to mimic Buffett’s investments today, for the simple reason that he is severely disadvantaged compared to yourself. 

If Buffett were in your shoes, he most definitely wouldn’t be looking at Berkshire Hathaway for copycat ideas. You see, one of the things that is not talked enough about, when people are discussing Buffett is that he has been extremely adaptable. 

There are assets worth a total of $788 billion on the Berkshire Hathaway balance sheet. If the company would want to deploy 1% of its assets base to one investment, that investment would have to be valued at $7.8 billion. By comparison, the smallest company in the S&P 500 index has a market cap of $1.5 billion.

Therefore, if Buffett wants to make an investment that actually moves the needle today, his universe of available investment opportunities is actually tiny. 

The Buffett Partnership

So, how did Buffett invest early in his career, when he was a much smaller fish in a much bigger pond? This question brings you to the the Buffett Partnership, which Buffett managed from 1956 to 1969. When Buffett dissolved the Partnership in 1970, he kept his stake in Berkshire Hathaway, which the Partnership had had a controlling shareholder in. The rest is history, I guess.

First of all, during the Partnership years, Buffett invested in smaller, less liquid companies. Secondly, Buffett was a relatively concentrated investor, focusing on a few high conviction ideas. Nonetheless, this does not mean he didn’t try to diversify the Buffett Partnership Portfolio. The way he did it was not through quantity of exposure, but through the quality of exposure. 

By quality, I don’t mean that the stocks he chose were of higher quality than the stocks in the general market. But rather that he managed the stock portfolio by allocating its capital into three buckets that each had exposure to qualitatively different factors. 

The Three Arrows of Buffett’s Capital Allocation

His objective, as I understand it, was to be able to keep his options open and be flexible under different market conditions. For example, if the overall market went up, he would be able to allocate capital to the bucket of stocks that were not driven by the overall market, and vice versa if market sentiment was overly pessimistic. 

But you don’t have to take my word for it. Here is Buffett’s explanation of the three qualitative areas that he allocated capital to. The following is taken from the 1961 Buffet Partnership Letter Shareholders:

Our Method of Operation 

Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors. 

The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen. 

Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner. 

The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market. 

Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies. 

This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in workouts, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development.

I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs. 

The final category is “control” situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it.

These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company’s stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.

This is the biggest mistake value investors make

Value Investing is seductively easy. Summarized into one sentence, Value Investing is the art of picking stocks that are undervalued, a.k.a. buying a dollar for 50 cents.

Tempting, right?

The big problem – paraphrasing what Johan Cruyff said about football – Value Investing is a simple concept, but it is extremely hard to invest with simplicity.

How Value Investors Buy Books

Consider the following analogy:

Put yourself in the shoes of a Value Investor in a book store. Having a natural inclination to buy stuff that is undervalued, you will automatically be drawn to the table with a big sign saying:

  • Books 50-80% OFF! 

…and therein lies the problem.

Buying a book is a bet with an asymmetric outcome. The downside is that you will buy a book and it might turn out to be a waste of your time, plus the $10 to $30 it cost to purchase it. The upside, however, is close to infinite. A good book can fundamentally alter your life.

Coffee consumption is another good example. If you could only drink one cup of coffee a day, you would probably not drink the first cup of joe available to you. You would be more selective. You might even be willing to pay more for the right one.

Mistakes of Omission

Most of the books on the discount table are crap. They are there for a reason.

The Value Investor, focused on the table of discounted books, might end up finding a book that is good enough to be worth the purchase.

At the same time, his attention is turned away from the books that can truly alter his life.

Do you disagree? Let us know in the comments below!

Discount to Net Asset Value | Protect Your Downside

One way to value a stock, especially those of companies that own various subsidiaries or a portfolio of assets, is by analysing the company’s discount (or surplus) to Net Asset Value.

Conglomerate Discount – The Case of Exor

We recently took a close look at Exor N.V., the holding company that controls such publicly traded companies as Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Ferrari and CNH Industries. Conglomerates like Exor are interesting to analyse as they tend to trade a steep discount on the mark-to-market Net Asset Values (or market-adjusted book value).

In the case of Exor, the company trades at about a 30% discount on the market value of assets on the balance sheet. 

Point of Maximum Pessimism – The Case of Dundee Corporation

If you are a Contrarian Investor, you are trying to go where other investors feel extremely uncomfortable to be. You are trying to go where others are running to the exits, but at the same time, you don’t want to be too early. 

One of those situations is materializing at a Canadian Asset Management Company called Dundee Corporation. After a series of unfortunate events (and decisions), the market capitalization of Dundee is gone from about a billion dollars to about $74 million. 

The company trades at a steep discount to book value, but for good reason. The company has been haemorrhaging money as failed investments have sucked up cash and destroyed shareholders’ capital. 

But investors may have overreacted. Even though the company is taking drastic steps to turn the business around, Dundee’s stock is trading at about a 70% discount to book value. If the company manages to stop the bleeding, a significant re-rating might be in the cards. 

The Fundamentals are in the Footnotes

The whole point of fundamental research or value investing or whatever you want to call it is to get an edge by looking a little deeper than others are looking. This is why you won’t get very far by using stock screeners.

Stock Research on Onverstock.com 

We recently published a stock report on the Fundamental Finance Playbook about Overstock.com. The article is a deep dive into the current status of the company’s online retail business. We try to figure out if the business is, in fact, in a turnaround as management claims, or if the company is at risk of running out of cash.

Previously, the management had stated that they were trying to sell the online retail business but so far nothing has materialized. During our research phase we noticed that during the last quarter, consulting fees on the corporate level had increased significantly. By corporate level, we mean not connected to the operations of the online retail business nor the blockchain ventures.

Overstock engaged Guggenheim in 2018 to explore strategic options for the retail business and find possible buyers. If the consulting expenses are mostly in the “Other” business segment and neither in the retail operations nor the tZero operations, it is plausible that Overstock is already in advance negotiations with potential buyers through Guggenheim.

What that indicated to us, was that there was a possibility that Overstock was already working with Guggenheim Securities, the company that Overstock employed to find buyers, on advanced negotiations with possible buyers. These kinds of transactions usually require heavy due diligence, so it would be quite plausible that costs would ramp up like this.

Two Potential Acquirers 

A week after we published, Patrick Byrne, Chairman and CEO of Overstock said in an interview with CNN that the company was in negotiations with two potential acquirers. It remains to be seen if anything materializes from this, but it goes to show that sometimes the fundamental facts are buried in the footnotes.